Abstract
This article examines the unexpected rise in public approval for President Tokayev following Bloody January in Kazakhstan, despite being perceived as Nazarbayev’s henchman. Drawing on rally-around-the-flag literature, we explore how domestic crises in authoritarian regimes can serve as rally points. Using Central Asia Barometer data, we apply coarsened exact matching and linear regression to assess changes in presidential approval before and after the crisis. Our findings indicate a rally effect. We argue that Tokayev's rising approval was consistent with strategic narrative control, elite purges and a decisive break from the Nazarbayev era, rather than gradual reform or international conflict. While we do not directly test the framing mechanism, the findings are consistent with theories of strategic crisis framing in authoritarian regimes. The study provides quasi-experimental evidence that domestic crises can generate rally effects in authoritarian regimes and demonstrates the value of applying such methods to Central Asian political research.