WHEN COMPETITORS MATTER?

2020

Closed access Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.47344/sdubss.v52i1.44
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

This review paper focuses to define broadly when thecompanies pay attention to their competitors from the logic of multimarketstrategy theory. The theory assumes that firms usually intentionally enters torivals market to decrease the rivalry. According to Mutual Forbearance logic,when competitors are operating in several markets simultaneously, it reduces theintensive competition, so one rival attack in one market might cause to beattacked by that firm in another market. So due to that firms usually have lessmotivation in hostile actions and enters each other’s market by creatingmultimarket contact. Also, this paper emphasizes that the multimarket strategyusually causes not intentional strategies of the firms, also due to the chance ofmultimarket contacts (MMC). This research distinguishes the notions of naïveMMC and purposive MMC depending on competitor awareness