Can a Constitutional Monarch Influence Democratic Preferences? The Regulation of Public Expression in Japan

2021

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DOI 10.33774/apsa-2021-fp8q8-v2
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

This study examines whether constitutional monarchs, who are non-political symbolic figures, have any influence on ideological attitudes under a democracy. We design a unique survey experiment on the emperor of Japan regarding the regulation of public expression. This issue can be framed both as left-wing (i.e., the regulation of hate speech) and right-wing (i.e., the regulation of publicly funded anti-nationalistic exhibitions). Taking advantage of the dual nature of the issue, we test the effects of the emperor's endorsement on support for regulation under each ideological framework. The results indicate that the (former) emperor's endorsement for freedom of expression does have a cross-cutting effect and decreases support for regulation. This effect is relatively small but statistically significant. Additionally, the findings provide weak evidence for the emperor's own ideological position conditioning his endorsement effect. These results provide new insights into how supposedly non-political popular figures can influence the formation of democratic preferences.