INTERACTION OF PARLIAMENTS WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCHES IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND KAZAKHSTAN: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2015

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DOI 10.12955/cbup.v3.655
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

Studies on legislature-executive relations have gained a crucial place in the field of comparative politics. However, the most intriguing challenge for comparative political studies has been investigating the collapse of socialist regimes and development of new institutions in post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Accordingly, this article compares legislative-executive relations in Kazakhstan and Romania, in a longitudinal perspective, from the time of communism’s collapse. These relationships have evolved somewhat differently in Romania compared to Kazakhstan, despite both countries having semi-presidential systems. A comparative analysis helps us to better understand the role and place of the parliament in each of the respective countries. The authors identify similarities and differences of legislature-executive relations in post-communist Romania and post-Soviet Kazakhstan, while making some inference about the strength of legislatures. The article concludes with a summation that the frequent cases of no-confidence votes in Romania has resulted in an unstable government and, often, governmental crises, but at the same time, this indicates a relatively powerful parliament, whereas the non-existence of such practices in Kazakhstan has contributed to a strong, stable, and unanimous cabinet, but with a weak and subservient parliament.