Humanity

Rustam B. Atadjanov

2022

Closed access Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_1
Data confidence 70 medium
How this score is calculated

It is built from checkable properties of the record itself: whether the article has a DOI, how many independent sources confirmed its data, whether the required fields are filled in, and how recent the latest confirmation is. Disagreement between sources and a missing identifier lower it. A value of 80 or above means the record was published without further checking; 60 to 79 means it is published at reduced confidence, with a manual check advisable. A record verified by an editor by hand is never pushed below 90 by a recalculation. This scores our data about the article, not the article itself.

Abstract

The discussion of values protected by international law will not diminish in significance. Those are quite diverse and heterogeneous as is the extent to which they have been established or clarified in law. If some of them have already been legally well defined, this is not so for others. The concept of humanity belongs to such yet undefined concepts. While it is hard to imagine a more compelling and global idea for appeal in the modern public discourse worldwide than the idea of humanity it is also difficult to find a more ambiguous category. No explicit definition of ʻhumanityʼ currently exists in international legal documents or in relevant case-law. The chapter argues that without understanding this basic underlying value many important questions will continue arising on the precise nature of key relevant legal categories in different branches of international law. It then offers several observations on the role of humanity in international law: first, there has been no comprehensive formulation for the concept of humanity, in international law or beyond; second, the notion of humanity found itself constantly reinstated in different civilizations and societies, always carrying with it the same fundamental and basic values, or humanitarian sentiments; third, the concept of humanity does not represent an autonomous source of international law. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the concept (value) of humanity in light of several legal branches constituting an integral part of ICSL: international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, with a view to demonstrating the role of humanity for the pertaining legal categories and its relationship with those (e.g., humanity as a central protected interest of crimes against humanity at both domestic and universal levels). A comprehensive view of humanity as ʻhumannessʼ, or status of being human, is offered as instrumental in the understanding of the protective scope of the examined branches of law. In conclusion, a recommendation is made to secure a holistic definition of humanity at the international treaty level.