The Unanticipated Utility of U.S. Security Structures: Avoiding Cold War II in Central Asia

2006

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DOI 10.1080/01495930601028648
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

After the demise of bipolarity there are at least two significant impediments in creating a more secure, cooperative and prosperous global system. One involves miscalculations in the West, while the other rests with a fundamental misunderstanding in Moscow and Beijing regarding the nature of success inherent in liberal democracies and market economics. Development is a long-term process and Western attempts at achieving overnight results require near political suicide from entrenched elites. A policy that requires irrationality on the part of decision makers in the developing world is prone to suboptimal outcomes. Moreover, leaders in the former Soviet Union and Beijing misunderstand two of the most important aspects of long-term Western success: secure intellectual property rights creating the incentives for innovation, creativity and technical change, and the mitigation of the effects of the security dilemma by creating security structures that complement rather than compete with one another. The article analyzes these issues from a geopolitical perspective and assesses their impact on potential policy options.