Russia’s Iron Horse and Its Logistics Limitations in the Ukrainian War

2023

Closed access Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.1080/13518046.2023.2283963
Data confidence 70 medium
How this score is calculated

It is built from checkable properties of the record itself: whether the article has a DOI, how many independent sources confirmed its data, whether the required fields are filled in, and how recent the latest confirmation is. Disagreement between sources and a missing identifier lower it. A value of 80 or above means the record was published without further checking; 60 to 79 means it is published at reduced confidence, with a manual check advisable. A record verified by an editor by hand is never pushed below 90 by a recalculation. This scores our data about the article, not the article itself.

Abstract

The slow advance of the Russian army in Ukraine in the first stage of its invasion and its eventual withdrawal from the Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions in April 2022 has raised several questions among analysts. Although this situation can be explained by numerous factors, this research note highlights how the Russian military’s organization of its logistics and resupply around railways has played a significant role in its failure to achieve the Kremlin’s initial objectives.