Abstract
The paper analyses the case of labor migration of CIS ethnic Koreans (Koryo-saram) to South Korea. Because of an ethnicity-based preferential policy, they are offered better conditions than other migrants, but in many cases they choose to switch to a condition of semi-compliance by voluntarily taking jobs in sectors that fall out of their visa requirements. This option is dictated by the absence of Korean language skills and better remuneration in the illegal market, but at the same time exposes them to worse working conditions and vulnerability caused by illegality. This situation, that is convenient for all parties – the state, employers, sub-contracting recruitment agencies and in the short term also migrants – can be explained by two factors – a neoliberal distortion of the local job market in the interests of companies and the resilience of Koryo-saram workers – that are marked by an underlying inequality of power structures. An approach focused on political feasibility suggests that trade unions could be the best answer at hand to address this condition with possible mid-term improvements deriving from forms of transnational social protection.