Cooperation and conflict in Turkish–Israeli relations since the 1990s

2023

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DOI 10.1080/13537121.2024.2295604
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

Turkish-Israeli relations, which achieved the level of strategic cooperation in the late 1990s, began to decline in the late 2000s, especially after Israel’s 2008–9 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The existing literature enumerates several factors underlying the bilateral relationship but tends to overlook both states’ perceived identities and self-images. Focusing on the identity factor, this article ascribes the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations to the major changes in Turkey’s state identity during the years of AKP rule. By way of substantiating this argument, the article provides a brief overview of the literature on the role of state identity in international relations before exploring four case studies that exemplify the influence of state identity on Turkish-Israeli relations: the bilateral military cooperation agreement (1996); Operation Cast Lead and the attendant ‘Davos incident’ (2008–9); the Mavi Marmara crisis (2010); and the ‘Arab Spring’ of the early 2010s.