Abstract
Low-power microcontrollers, wireless sensors, and embedded gateways form the backbone of many Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. However, their limited memory, constrained energy budgets, and lack of standardized firmware make them attractive targets for diverse attacks, including bootloader backdoors, hardcoded keys, unpatched CVE exploits, and code-reuse attacks, while traditional single-layer defenses are insufficient as they often assume abundant resources. This paper presents a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) conducted according to the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, covering 196 peer-reviewed studies on cross-layer security for resource-constrained IoT and Industrial IoT environments, and introduces a four-axis taxonomy—system level, algorithmic paradigm, data granularity, and hardware budget—to structure and compare prior work. At the firmware level, we analyze static analysis, symbolic execution, and machine learning-based binary similarity detection that operate without requiring source code or a full runtime; at the network and behavioral levels, we review lightweight and graph-based intrusion detection systems (IDS), including single-packet authorization, unsupervised anomaly detection, RF spectrum monitoring, and sensor–actuator anomaly analysis bridging cyber-physical security; and at the policy level, we survey identity management, micro-segmentation, and zero-trust enforcement mechanisms supported by blockchain-based authentication and programmable policy enforcement points (PEPs). Our review identifies current strengths, limitations, and open challenges—including scalable firmware reverse engineering, efficient cross-ISA symbolic learning, and practical spectrum anomaly detection under constrained computing environments—and by integrating diverse security layers within a unified taxonomy, this SLR highlights both the state-of-the-art and promising research directions for advancing IoT security.