Abstract
Purpose. This paper examines how renewable energy (RE) auction projects can be delivered effectively in Central Asia, with a focus on Kazakhstan, by aligning project delivery practices and procurement rules with local institutional conditions. Methodology. The study applies a thematic synthesis of peer-reviewed literature and selected industry reports on RE auctions and project delivery. Qualitative coding groups reported drivers and barriers into domains (tender design, risk allocation, grid and regulatory constraints, financial guarantees, EPC/O&M capabilities). A comparative matrix for Germany, Chile and India is then used to derive implications for emerging auction regimes in Central Asia. Originality/value. This review links auction design to project delivery by showing how institutional conditions shape whether auction portfolios are implemented, shifting attention from bid prices to implementation risk and system integration. Findings. Germany, Chile and India share objectives of mobilising investment, lowering prices and ensuring delivery, but they rely on different combinations of prequalification, contract models and risk-allocation mechanisms. Across cases, implementation performance depends on: (1) tender design with proportionate requirements and enforceable sanctions; (2) enabling institutional conditions (predictable policy, credible offtakers, and timely grid expansion); and (3) investor-side delivery capability, including EPC and O&M readiness. For Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the main bottlenecks reported in the literature are regulatory volatility, grid and permitting constraints, and limited local EPC/O&M capacity. The paper proposes recommendations on aligning regulatory and project cycles, coordinating grid planning with auction schedules, and calibrating prequalification and guarantees to local risks.