Russian adventurism and Central Asian leaders’ foreign policy rhetoric: Evidence from the UN General Debate corpus

2024

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DOI 10.1177/20531680241254190
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

How do smaller states position themselves in the biggest diplomatic forum when a regional power with which they share deep economic and political ties is engaged in foreign adventurism with its neighbors? We answer this question by examining how the five Central Asian countries (the “-stans”) have crafted their United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) speeches in the aftermath of three recent instances of Russian foreign adventurism: Russo-Georgian War in 2008, Crimea Annexation in 2014, and the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022. Our quantitative assessment of the appearance of sovereignty frames in the UN General Debate corpus from 1992 to 2022 suggests that while historically the Central Asian states have refrained from invoking themes related to sovereignty, the recent full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shifted these countries’ position, whereby they no longer keep themselves away from discussions related to state sovereignty. The fact that Central Asian countries are willing to engage in discussions that are not liked by Russia suggests that these countries are attempting to make their concerns about an aggressive regional power known to the global community.