On the Path to Trade Liberalisation: Political Regimes in Trade Negotiations

2015

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DOI 10.1111/twec.12280
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

Abstract The number of free trade agreements (FTA) has increased substantially since 1990 despite efforts to promote multilateral trade liberalisation. While there is evidence on the determinants of FTA formation, still little is known on the processing of trade agreements, particularly regarding the pre‐implementation duration. This paper fills the research gap by using event data on the negotiation, the signing and the implementation of trade agreements. Duration analysis is employed to examine the connection between regime types and the lengths of the negotiation and the ratification stages. The results support the claim that higher levels of democratisation are associated with shorter negotiations, while political constraints lead to delays. Moreover, the depth of an agreement matters: a higher number of WTO‐X and WTO+ provisions do not only prolong the negotiation stage, but also the subsequent ratification. Against the background of potential anticipation effects of trade agreements, these results are of interest for exporting firms that assess the timing of implementation.