Abstract
On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held an independence referendum that delivered an overwhelming “Yes” vote yet produced neither recognition nor statehood. Why did a high-mobilization secession bid by an entity with long-standing de facto autonomy fail so quickly? This article tests Bridget Coggins’s recognition–coordination model against domestic “viability” explanations centered on elite incentives, institutional cohesion, and political economy. It argues that the binding constraint on Kurdish state emergence was international admission: pivotal states and regional powers coordinated around Iraq’s territorial integrity, preventing any recognition cascade. Domestic viability nonetheless conditioned both the referendum’s strategy and its aftermath. Intra-elite rivalry, contested institutional legitimacy, party-segmented coercive authority, and rentier fiscal vulnerability reduced bargaining leverage and amplified external perceptions of risk, reinforcing coordinated non-recognition. Integrating admission and viability, the article shows how referendums can generate strong democratic signals yet fail when recognition thresholds are high and regional veto players can impose rapid costs. It contributes to comparative secession scholarship by specifying how domestic governance signals interact with external coordination to foreclose state emergence in regionally constrained settings.