Abstract
This article examines consciousness from a philosophical and legal perspective, treating it as a phenomenon situated between objectively observable cognitive processes and subjective experience that cannot be directly verified from the outside. Developments in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, neurotechnology, and artifi-cial intelligence bring this problem into practical legal theory. Law treats human beings as conscious agents, although their inner experience remains inaccessible to external observers. The aim is to develop an integra-tive conceptual model of consciousness that accounts for objectively recorded correlates and the phenomenal opacity of subjective experience, and to examine its implications for guilt, intent, legal capacity, mental pri-vacy, and the possible legal personhood of artificial systems. The study uses a qualitative conceptual-analytical approach combining ontological analysis, epistemological reconstruction, thought experiments, and normative-legal reflection. Consciousness is under-stood as a multilayered phenomenon grounded in biologi-cal and cognitive processes, yet not reducible to them. Legal categories presupposing conscious agency there-fore operate under epistemic uncertainty. As a normative response, the article proposes the «presumption of consciousness» for complex systems. This principle does not entail automatic recognition of AI as a legal subject, but requires caution before dismissing the possibility of subjective experience in highly advanced ar-tificial agents. Keywords: consciousness, subjective experience, ontological uncertainty, legal personhood, mental privacy, neurolaw, artificial intelligence, presumption of consciousness, mental integrity, epistemic uncertainty.