Abstract
Social conflict studies view social conflict as a dysfunction requiring technical resolution, thereby concealing a normative bias in favor of stability at the expense of justice and recognition. The article argues that the institutionalization of social conflict is an inescapably philosophical problem, and that conflict studies must be reconstructed as a normative discipline capable of assessing the legitimacy, rather than merely the effectiveness, of conflict management institutions. Drawing on Hegel’s dialectic of recognition, Georg Simmel’s sociology of conflict, Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, and Ralf Dahrendorf’s theory of institutionalization, the article examines social conflict as a constitutive condition of social order. Regional conflict management institutions — the Aksakal Council in Kyrgyzstan, the mahalla system in Uzbekistan, and the legislative model of mediation in Kazakhstan — are interpreted as examples of what the article terms «pseudo-institutionalization»: conflict is contained but not legitimized, suppressed but not transformed. Thus, the analysis in this article revolves around three social tensions: justice versus stability, formal institutions versus informal practices, and state control versus social dialogue. In conclusion, three normatively grounded principles — reflexive justice, dialogical accountability, and agonistic legitimacy — are proposed as the minimum conditions necessary for an institution to claim normative legitimacy in the realm of social conflict.Keywords: social conflict, institutionalization, conflictology, agonistic pluralism, reflexive justice, post-Soviet governance, Central Asia, political legitimacy, recognition, negative peace.