Abstract
Central Asia has become a region in which the relative position of China and Russia is shifting in China’s favour, yet this shift has not produced open rivalry. Power Transition Theory would expect a narrowing gap between a rising and an incumbent power to generate friction; the “New Great Game” literature anticipates intensified competition; and the accommodation literature explains the absence of rivalry through Russia’s adaptation and China’s restraint. This article asks whether, and how, that accommodation has survived the intensification of asymmetry after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Drawing on Relational Power Analysis, it argues that the transition in Central Asia is sectoral rather than systemic: China’s gains are concentrated in connectivity, trade, finance and institution-building, while Russia retains central positions in regime security, labour migration and parts of the energy-transit network. Open confrontation is suppressed by three conditions – Russia’s growing reversed dependency on China, China’s calibrated restraint in regime security, and the hedging strategies of Central Asian states, which disperse the transition across issue areas and extract benefits from both powers. The resulting pattern is conceptualised as structured rivalry: incompatible long-term positional interests pursued through low-visibility mechanisms rather than overt contestation. The argument is assessed through a structured, focused comparison of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (2022–2026), which systematically weighs it against power-transition, alignment and accommodation explanations. The findings refine the accommodation thesis, specify the scope conditions under which regional power transitions remain peaceful, and show how the agency of smaller states shapes the pace and form of great-power adjustment.