Abstract
The Republic of Kazakhstan is currently transitioning its system of social guarantees for employees in harmful and hazardous working conditions from a certification-based, compensatory model to a preventive, risk-oriented regulatory framework. This transition has created significant legal conflicts, as new employer obligations under the risk-oriented approach are not yet reconciled with the existing compensation mechanisms. This study aims to identify the key legal conflicts and legislative innovations arising from this shift in Kazakhstani labor law, and to substantiate a unified legal basis for differentiating employee guarantees. The research employs formal-legal, systemic-structural, and comparative-legal methods, supplemented by a statistical analysis of official data from the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2021–2025) on workforce exposure to harmful conditions, social guarantee coverage, and employer expenditures. The analysis reveals that the growth in employer expenditures on social guarantees outpaces employment dynamics and is not accompanied by a corresponding expansion in worker coverage. This indicates the persistence of a costly compensatory logic, rather than a preventive strategy. Furthermore, the study identifies regulatory fragmentation, a lack of transparency in compensatory surcharges, and weak employer incentives for risk reduction. To address these issues, the paper substantiates the consolidation of occupational risk assessment as the single legal fact determining the scope of social guarantees. It concludes that a coordinated amendment of labor, social, and subordinate regulations is necessary—one that safeguards workers’ acquired rights while facilitating the transition from a costly compensatory model to a socially just and effective occupational risk management system.