Abstract
In classical archaeological theory, the archaeological source was interpreted as a material object, empirical evidence, or a representation of the past. Although contemporary theoretical archaeology recognizes the significance of material agency and the ontological status of objects, the epistemological status of the archaeological source in concept formation, the logic of proof, and the determination of interpretive boundaries remains insufficiently systematized. This article proposes a philosophical reconsideration of the status of the archaeological source and its justification as an analytical agent in the process of knowledge production. The study employs a qualitative method and draws on insights from process philosophy, the philosophy of historical science, and material agency. Using conceptual and hermeneutic analysis, the study reveals the cognitive function of the archaeological source within the system of scientific explanation. The example of the Botai culture shows how archaeological data can contribute to the revision of scientific interpretations and conceptual frameworks. The concept of the “analytical agent” proposed in the article makes it possible to describe the ability of material structures to direct research questions, determine the logic of proof, and indicate the limits of interpretation. Moreover, the proposed approach allows archaeology to be considered not only as a science that reconstructs the past, but also as a philosophical field that determines the conditions for the emergence of historical knowledge. The findings contribute to reconsidering the cognitive role of archaeological evidence and to strengthening the dialogue between archaeology and philosophy.