Institutional architecture of economic cooperation between Central Asian countries and external partners within the “5+1” formats: mechanisms and implementation instruments

2026

Full text Open access: Gold Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.46914/1562-2959-2026-1-3-120-135
Data confidence 85 high
How this score is calculated

It is built from checkable properties of the record itself: whether the article has a DOI, how many independent sources confirmed its data, whether the required fields are filled in, and how recent the latest confirmation is. Disagreement between sources and a missing identifier lower it. A value of 80 or above means the record was published without further checking; 60 to 79 means it is published at reduced confidence, with a manual check advisable. A record verified by an editor by hand is never pushed below 90 by a recalculation. This scores our data about the article, not the article itself.

Abstract

The past decade has witnessed the active institutionalisation of multilateral “5+1” formats between the Central Asian states and external partners. This trend has been reflected in the growing number of summits, ministerial meetings, and joint declarations, although these political developments have not always been followed by economic implementation of a comparable scale. This article examines the institutional mechanisms and instruments that facilitate the transition from political agreements to the implementation of economic projects within the “5+1” formats involving the United States, China, and the European Union between 2015–2025. Drawing on comparative institutional analysis, content analysis of official documents, and case studies, each format is assessed according to six qualitative criteria: regularity of interaction, permanent coordination bodies, specificity of roadmaps, financial provision, monitoring mechanisms, and project outcomes. Multilateral commitments are consistently distinguished from parallel bilateral agreements. The analysis demonstrates that all three formats demonstrate comparable institutional maturity in terms of high-level engagement and permanent coordination mechanisms. However, they differ substantially in the specificity of roadmaps, the alignment of financial instruments with the multilateral level, and the availability of monitoring arrangements. The European Union format has the most developed roadmap and monitoring architecture, whereas the US and Chinese formats reveal a persistent gap between announced funding volumes and their institutional linkage to multilateral rather than bilateral cooperation. The research’s novelty lies in developing a qualitative, non-aggregated comparative framework connecting institutional architecture with documented project outcomes. Its practical significance concerns its applicability to Central Asian ministries, regional coordination bodies, and development institutions.