Institutional Transmission into Project-Finance Cash Flows: Evidence from Chinese-Invested Renewable Energy in Kazakhstan

2026

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DOI 10.31489/2026ec3/1285
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

Why do renewable energy projects in the same country, using similar technology and identical export credit insurance, end up with realised investment ranging from 15.7 percent below budget to 15.0 percent above? This study examines ten Chinese-invested utility-scale wind and solar projects in Kazakhstan that reached financial close between 2018 and 2026, representing a near-complete set of observable cases with full contractual and audited financial records. The variation is not explained by technology. It arises from how the host-country institutional regime enters project contracts and reshapes cash flows. Three channels are identified. Lender-conditioned loan architecture affects the cost of debt: under identical China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation coverage, direct commercial-bank Chinese-yuan loans carry a 153-basis-point rate advantage and include a six-month principal grace period relative to development-bank refinancing. Dynamic fiscal upgrading alters capital commitments, as investment incentives are renegotiated through supplementary agreements that require 29–57 percent additional capital. Balancing-market asymmetry redistributes operating revenue, with under-generation penalised at roughly 2.8 times the rate of over-generation rewards. Drawing on contract text, audited accounts, and settlement files, the analysis shows that cost variation is partly structured at the contract-design stage rather than arising solely during execution. The findings carry implications for project sponsors, for Kazakhstani policymakers calibrating balancing-market and development-bank rules, and for research on institutional effects in emerging-market project finance.