Abstract
This article analyses how a sovereignty-based constitutional system integrates subnational human rights obligations into its national legal order. The research analyses the relationship between constitutional supremacy and international human rights obligations in Kazakhstan, examining the intensity and structure of this integration. The research methodology employs structured doctrinal analysis of decisions on constitutional review enacted between 2015 and 2025, supplemented with proportional analysis of intensity and institutional examination of additional avenues of accountability beyond judicial review. The findings reveal that international human rights obligations are formally entrenched, institutionally acknowledged yet interact with constitutional norms only in an interpretative rather than constraining manner apart from isolated instances of normatively convergent application in cases where such obligations directly inform constitutional doctrine in socially sensitive areas. The effectiveness of institutionalized structures such as the Ombudsman and structures and preventative oversight bodies is limited to mediated implementation rather than coercive enforcement. The research characterizes this as a sovereignty-based pluralism in which the accountability for subnational entities is entrenched yet normatively subordinated to the sovereignty-based system. The findings contribute to comparative constitutional law by revealing a hybrid integration model that undermines categorization of systems based on monism or dualism. The findings also contribute to a deeper understanding of limits to effectiveness of human rights obligations in systems based on sovereignty and conditions for integration with subnational entities.