Multifactorial Model of the Confrontation of Financial Resources of the Parties in Targeted Attacks

Valeriy Lakhno, V. Malyukov, Inna Malyukova, Bakhytzhan Akhmetov, Zhuldyz Alimseitova, Moldir Ydyryshbayeva

2026

Full text Open access: Gold Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.12720/jait.17.8.1557-1570
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

A multifactorial model of countering targeted attacks (Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) attacks) is considered in the context of available financial resources within the framework of a bilinear multistep quality game with several terminal surfaces.The distinguishing feature of the proposed model is its incorporation of multivariance in financial strategies for safeguarding against APT attacks and counterattacks, which is manifested in the dynamics of interaction between opposing sides.This facilitates the consideration of the overarching problem of cyber defense within the framework of the game scheme, encompassing the tasks of countering APT attacks with the financial resources available to the defense side.The proposed solution to the problem entailed the implementation of a bilinear multistep game of the quality of multidimensional objects.The resolution of quality issues, considering their multidimensionality and the bilinearity of the dynamics of player interaction, is a rather challenging problem.However, the formulated problem was solved in the paper by employing the optimality principle of R. Bellman.The solution was identified within the framework of a positional multistep game scheme with complete information.A comprehensive investigation was conducted to ascertain the optimal strategies for allocating the financial resources of the first player to build a system of protection against targeted attacks.The model delineated in the paper was implemented in the form of a software module of an intelligent information system.The results of a computational experiment that was conducted to test the model's operability are presented herein.