Hybrid Identity and Religious Radicalization: On the Effectiveness of Kazakhstan's State Policy

Sholpan Zhandossova, М.М. Nurov

2026

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DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2849
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between hybrid identity and religious radicalization in Kazakhstan, arguing that state policy has been built on a systematically inverted risk hierarchy. Drawing on secondary analysis of longitudinal sociological surveys, expert assessments, and official statistics, the article demonstrates that the intensity of religious practice is a statistically non-significant predictor of radicalization (ρ=+0.18; p>0.05), whereas identity fragmentation– the internal incoherence between competing ethnic, Soviet-secular, Islamic, and civic- Kazakhstani identity layers–carries the strongest positive correlation (ρ=+0.61; p<0.001). The normative architecture constructed between 2011 and 2024 is evaluated against these empirical predictors across four analytical levels: longitudinal trend analysis, regional identity profiling, factor correlation analysis, and institutional trust trajectories. The article finds that successive policy instruments have concentrated institutional resources on the weakest risk factor while leaving the strongest predictors structurally unaddressed. The post-2016 decline in registered criminal cases is attributed primarily to the organizational collapse of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as a recruitment structure rather than to domestic policy effectiveness. Trust in the state-affiliated religious authority declined by twenty percentage points over the period of maximum normative intensity–an outcome directly contrary to policy intent. The article concludes with three evidence-based corrective directions: reorienting the diagnostic framework toward monitoring identity fragmentation, recovering protective social factors as explicit policy targets, and restructuring formal religious authority to allow community-derived legitimacy to carry preventive functions.