Abstract
This chapter examines anti-corruption examination of normative legal acts as a preventive governance instrument in post-socialist contexts, with a particular focus on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Although both countries have formally institutionalised anti-corruption examination within their lawmaking processes, corruption risks and legal loopholes continue to persist in enacted legislation. The chapter addresses a central puzzle: why do corruption-inducing provisions continue to emerge despite the existence of mandatory risk assessment mechanisms? Adopting a comparative socio-legal and political economy approach, the chapter analyses the evolution of anti-corruption examination frameworks, institutional designs, and implementation practices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The analysis combines doctrinal legal review with qualitative empirical data, including semi-structured interviews with current and former anti-corruption experts, government officials, and legal practitioners, as well as an examination of expert conclusions and publicly debated legislative cases. The findings demonstrate that anti-corruption examination operates as a hybrid institution, combining elements of formal legal rationality with informal governance practices. In Kazakhstan, an externally oriented and transparent “scientific” model enhances visibility but remains constrained by the advisory status of expert conclusions and weak mechanisms for enforcing recommendations. In Uzbekistan, a centralised and mandatory model ensures comprehensive coverage but limits transparency and independent scrutiny, often reducing examination to procedural compliance. In both cases, corruption risks are frequently embedded at the drafting stage through vague formulations, discretionary powers, and institutional designs that concentrate authority while diffusing accountability. The chapter contributes to socio-legal and anti-corruption scholarship by shifting the analytical focus from failures of law enforcement to the politics of lawmaking itself. It demonstrates that the effectiveness of preventive legal instruments depends not only on methodology or legal design but also on the institutional positioning of expertise, political incentives, and informal power relations that shape legislative processes.