Manufacturing compliance: How pariah autocracies strategically engage with international human rights mechanisms

2026

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DOI 10.1177/01925121261446641
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

Why do pariah autocracies engage with international human rights institutions? This study explores how pariah autocracies, states that are isolated from the international community and domestically unresponsive autocracies lacking democratic institutions, use the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review to shape their international reputations. We argue that these autocracies craft diplomatic strategies that create an image of compliance while protecting their essential political structures. Our findings show that such participation aims less at improving human rights and more at securing legitimacy and crafting a facade of international responsiveness. Pariah autocracies are deliberate actors that navigate international norms to serve their interests. The study sheds light on the strategic ways international pariah autocracies interact with international human rights mechanisms for themselves.