Pragmatic nonrecognition as middle power statecraft in Kazakhstan’s engagement with Taliban ruled Afghanistan

Discover Global Society, 2026

Full text Open access: Gold Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.1007/s44282-026-00478-4
Data confidence 70 medium
How this score is calculated

It is built from checkable properties of the record itself: whether the article has a DOI, how many independent sources confirmed its data, whether the required fields are filled in, and how recent the latest confirmation is. Disagreement between sources and a missing identifier lower it. A value of 80 or above means the record was published without further checking; 60 to 79 means it is published at reduced confidence, with a manual check advisable. A record verified by an editor by hand is never pushed below 90 by a recalculation. This scores our data about the article, not the article itself.

Abstract

The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 has compelled Central Asian states to reevaluate their security risks-connectivity ambition balance in the circumstances of contested recognition. This study analyzed the case of pragmatic non-recognition of Kazakhstan, in which a non-frontline middle power extends functional cooperation while intentionally refraining from granting diplomatic recognition. It brings recognition theory into dialogue with the literature on middle power diplomacy and Eurasian connectivity, conceptualizing pragmatic non-recognition as a repertoire of statecraft and advancing three propositions about likely behavior: multilateralized security hedging, incremental, risk-managed connectivity, and legal-technical engagement without recognition. Empirically, the study draws on documentary analysis, original estimates of bilateral trade patterns, eight semi-structured elite interviews with Afghan and Kazakh regional actors, and nine expert survey responses from Afghanistan and Pakistan, combined through thematic coding and process tracing. The analysis shows how Kazakhstan uses the CSTO and SCO frameworks to manage security externalities, relies on high-volume but reversible commodity trade and cautious participation in Trans-Afghan corridor initiatives, and deploys domestic delisting, special-ambassador diplomacy, and UN-facilitated talks to deepen cooperation while maintaining formal non-recognition.