К вопросу о месте прокуратуры в системе государственно-правовых институтов Нового Казахстана

2025

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DOI 10.54649/2077-9860-2025-4-18-24
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the constitutional and legal status of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the context of the implementation of the principle of “Law and Order” and the constitutional reforms of 2017 and 2022. The study analyzes the transformation of prosecutorial powers from the Soviet model of comprehensive supervision to a modern human rights-oriented institution with limited competence. Particular attention is devoted to the analysis of the power to challenge normative legal acts. Although this power was granted to the прокуратура de jure by the 1995 Constitution, it has remained de facto unrealized due to the absence of an appropriate procedural mechanism. The research also identifies systemic problems in the functioning of the Prosecutor’s Office, including the insufficient procedural independence of investigators, the limited scope of parliamentary control over the implementation of laws, and the subordination of all law enforcement bodies to the Head of State. These factors raise doubts about the objectivity of prosecutorial supervision. Based on the analysis conducted, the author substantiates the proposal to subordinate the Prosecutor’s Office to Parliament as the most promising direction for optimizing its institutional status within the transition to a presidential-parliamentary form of government. The author argues that such institutional reconfiguration would strengthen the system of checks and balances, enhance the independence of prosecutors, and ensure effective parliamentary oversight over the enforcement of laws.