Abstract
This article examines the institutional mechanisms of corporate lobbying in the context of Kazakhstan’s ongoing democratic transformation. The study focuses on two of the country’s most influential lobbying organizations the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK) and the KAZENERGY Association as key empirical cases. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of the revolving door, regulatory capture, and legislative subsidy, the authors identify and conceptualize two distinct models of corporate lobbying. In the case of AFK, lobbying practices are shown to be predominantly institutional in nature, relying on the capital, professional authority, and reputational resources of former high-ranking public officials integrated into expert and advisory processes. By contrast, the KAZENERGY case demonstrates a model of corporate technocratic influence grounded in the hierarchical structures, financial capacity, and transnational linkages of major energy corporations. Based on the findings, the article advances a set of analytical conclusions and policy-oriented recommendations aimed at improving the legislative regulation of lobbying activities in Kazakhstan and strengthening safeguards against conflicts of interest within the political system.