Methods for Protecting the ASCON Algorithm from Statistically Ineffective Fault Attacks Based On Cellular Automata

2026

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DOI 10.52209/1609-1825_2026_1_425
Data confidence 70 medium
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Abstract

The ASCON algorithm is widely used in lightweight cryptography, including embedded systems, the Internet of Things (IoT), and wireless networks, where high performance and low power consumption are crucial. The aim of this study is to develop and analyze a protection method for the ASCON algorithm against SIFA attacks that exploit computational faults. The paper examines the vulnerabilities of ASCON and the implementation methods of SIFA attacks, which can bypass traditional security mechanisms. As a countermeasure, the use of cellular automata operating under rules 90-150 is proposed to complicate key compromise. The developed modification of ASCON integrates a pseudorandom sequence generator, enhancing cryptographic resilience without significantly increasing computational overhead. Experimental simulations have confirmed the effectiveness of this method, demonstrating that the improved ASCON is reliably protected against SIFA attacks.