Abstract
The article examines criminological patterns of illicit cross-border movement of radioactive and nuclear-related materials involving Kazakhstan. The study triangulates 1) 27 publicly documented criminal cases (2015–2024), 2) unified register of pre-trial investigations (URPI) for the relevant Criminal Code provisions (2015–2024, disaggregated by year and region) and 3) international incident reporting and guidance documents used as a comparative benchmark. Methods include descriptive statistics, role-based criminological coding (offender roles, opportunity structures, detection pathways, and recurrence), and comparative legal analysis of sanctions and qualifying elements. The results indicate a stable «double-flow» risk: 1) episodic trafficking of sealed sources/uranium concentrates and 2) mixed channels where radioactive items appear alongside other contraband. The sample shows a recurring functional triad – collector, courier, and intermediary – suggesting networked offending rather than isolated opportunistic behavior. Uneven detection capacity and fragmented data exchange remain the most consistent enabling conditions. Sentencing practice, including repeated use of non-custodial measures in cross-border contexts, does not provide a convincing deterrent signal for high-consequence materials. The paper contributes 1) a Kazakhstan-focused criminological typology and role model for cross-border cases, 2) a structured «method → evidence → output» framework for replication, and 3) an implementable prevention package (graded approach in law, integrated data platform, and border-capability modernization roadmap for 2025–2027).