Abstract
In the context of the knowledge economy, human capital has become a critical source of competitive advantage for firms. However, the value of human capital is inherently difficult for external stakeholders to observe, creating information asymmetry that may lead to market undervaluation. Strategic human resource information disclosure serves as a potential mechanism for firms to signal their human capital quality and management capabilities to capital markets. Drawing upon signaling theory, resource-based view, and stakeholder theory, this study develops a theoretical framework to examine the pathways through which strategic human resource disclosure affects firm market value. The analysis identifies three primary pathways: a direct signaling effect whereby human resource disclosure reduces information asymmetry and enhances investor confidence; an indirect governance effect whereby the disclosure process itself reflects broader organizational capabilities; and a stakeholder response effect whereby disclosure influences the behavior of multiple stakeholder groups. The study further explores boundary conditions that moderate these effects, including disclosure characteristics (content type, detail level, verifiability), firm characteristics (ownership structure, size, industry), and institutional environment (regulatory intensity, market development). The theoretical framework provides a foundation for empirical testing and offers implications for corporate disclosure strategy and regulatory policy.