Security of the Three-Pass Protocol on Permutations

2025

Closed access Metadata (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.1109/idaacs68557.2025.11321972
Data confidence 70 medium
How this score is calculated

It is built from checkable properties of the record itself: whether the article has a DOI, how many independent sources confirmed its data, whether the required fields are filled in, and how recent the latest confirmation is. Disagreement between sources and a missing identifier lower it. A value of 80 or above means the record was published without further checking; 60 to 79 means it is published at reduced confidence, with a manual check advisable. A record verified by an editor by hand is never pushed below 90 by a recalculation. This scores our data about the article, not the article itself.

Abstract

In the context of modern digital communication, securing information exchange is increasingly critical, particularly against evolving threats in cryptanalysis. This research investigates the security aspects of the three-pass protocol based on permutations, focusing on identifying and mitigating potential vulnerabilities. The study proposes a set of guidelines for ensuring secure communication through this protocol. The protocol’s robustness against brute-force attacks is analyzed and compared with other well-known cryptographic protocols, such as the Shamir three-pass protocol and the MasseyOmura cryptosystem. The results highlight the importance of key length and permutation structure in maintaining security, particularly when dealing with large key spaces. Additionally, the practical implications of implementing this protocol in real-time communication systems, considering the computational demands and potential optimizations are explored.