SANCTION BUSTING, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONS

2025

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DOI 10.1142/s2194565925500083
Data confidence 85 high
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Abstract

This study examines the impact of sanctions and institutional quality on Russia’s import values across two periods (2022 and 2023), highlighting key dynamics in sanctioned versus non-sanctioned exports across regional integrations. Findings reveal that, overall, Russian import values did not change significantly across the observed periods. However, import values for non-sanctioned exports were estimated to be higher than those for sanctioned exports. Additionally, exporting countries with stronger institutional frameworks appear less likely to reduce the import value for Russia in the short term. Despite economic differences in regional integration (EU, EAEU, BRICS and ROW) and trade policies, contributions to import values for Russia are not significantly impacted by regional affiliations. Notably, an increase in the number of sanctioned exports is associated with a substantial decline in import values by approximately 83%. While sanctions are effective in reducing targeted trade, institutional quality and regional dynamics shape nuanced outcomes in sanctions enforcement and trade adjustments.