Abstract
The reliability of public opinion polls in authoritarian contexts, particularly in Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has been widely debated. Critics highlight preference falsification, selective nonresponse, and declining response rates as key limitations. Our study challenges the argument that wartime censorship reduces poll participation, especially among political dissenters. Analyzing paradata from 42 phone polls conducted between 2016 and 2024 in Russia, we examine trends in contact and cooperation rates, as well as the factors determining willingness to participate in public opinion polls. We demonstrate that cooperation rates declined before 2021 and remained stable thereafter, with only a temporary drop in 2023, which rebounded in 2024. Moreover, we demonstrate that before the war, respondents from regions with higher protest potential were less likely to participate in polls; however, this association became insignificant during the war. Political topics of surveys decreased the cooperation rate in wartime but increased cooperation in regions with higher protest potential. Our results suggest that public opinion polls serve as an alternative mechanism for political expression in areas of dissent under wartime censorship.