Abstract
The article delves into a comprehensive analysis of the realist theory of subversion among great powers, shedding light on a relatively overlooked phenomenon within the expanding body of literature on subversive statecraft. By employing a simple, rational cost-benefit calculation, the article demonstrates how this theory effectively explains the varying degrees of subversion observed among non-belligerent and belligerent great powers. Moreover, it emphasizes that subversion tends to occur more frequently, violently, and on a larger scale when directed towards weaker targets. To illustrate and provide initial support for the theory, the article presents concise case studies of mid-twentieth century subversion involving the Soviet Union and the United States. These case studies vividly highlight the theory's applicability and validity. In combination with empirical evidence, the analysis demonstrates that the circumstances conducive to highly consequential subversion among great powers are both limited and reversible in nature. On the other hand, belligerent great powers, driven by a heightened sense of competition and the pursuit of strategic advantage, tend to employ higher levels of subversion. Their motivations are rooted in a more aggressive and confrontational approach, seeking to undermine and weaken rival powers through covert actions. This heightened level of subversion is a product of the intense power struggles and rivalries that exist among these states. Consequently, the article introduces a healthy dose of skepticism regarding claims that the contemporary strategic landscape has fundamentally transformed the dynamics of great power rivalry, assigning subversion a newly central role. The theory and supporting evidence underscore the notion that the conditions necessary for such significant subversive actions among great powers are relatively rare, casting doubt on the argument that subversion has become a paramount aspect of contemporary international relations.