Сonceptual understanding of causality in analytic legal philosophy

А. Б. Дидикин

2024

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DOI 10.17223/1998863x/77/6

Data confidence 70 medium

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Abstract

The article presents an analysis of the main approaches to the conceptual understanding of the causality principle in analytic legal philosophy based on Hart and Honore’s theory. The most famous examples of the possibility to apply the arguments of David Hume and J. S. Mill in their understanding of causation to analyze propositions that include the legal assessment of empirical facts are considered. The article substantiates the position that the specificity of philosophical and legal argumentation in causality requires a clarification of the specificity of legal argumentation.