Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan: Issues of Improving the Status and Powers of the President and Parliament

2018

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DOI 10.17803/1994-1471.2018.90.5.185-192
Достоверность данных 70 средняя
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Аннотация

Within the framework of the constitutional reform held in Kazakhstan in 2017, there was a redistribution of power between the President, Parliament and Government. However, in the future it is necessary to continue the work to ensure the balance of powers of the highest authorities, and to increase the role of the legislative branch of power. There is a need to improve the norms of the constitutional legislation governing the status and powers of the President (on the requirements for the length of service for the presidential candidate, on the grounds and procedure for early termination of the powers of the President, on consulting the Constitutional Council when introducing the state of emergency and martial law, on securing the mechanism for appeals to the President by other subjects, on shortening the deadline for issuing a final decision of the Constitutional Council and the criteria for urgency consideration of the questions). In order to ensure a real multi-party system and, on this basis, full implementation of the parliamentary control over the activities of the Government, it is necessary to reduce the barrage in the distribution of mandates for the parties participating in the Majilis elections from 7 to 2-3%, to entitle the representative body directly without the participation of the President of the Republic to apply measures of constitutional and legal responsibility to the members of the Government, to improve the procedures for vote of confidence and no confidence to the Government, to exclude the responsibility of chairmen of chambers for the legality of acts adopted by Parliament.