Аннотация
This article scrutinizes the evolution of genocide as a legal category, tracing its development from the 1948 Genocide Convention through the landmark jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). These tribunals did not merely apply the Convention’s text; they substantially elaborated upon its principles, creating a coherent and adaptable body of case law. This crucial jurisprudential legacy was later institutionalized and expanded by the International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute of 17 July 1998, forming the bedrock of the post–Cold War framework for addressing genocide. The work of these institutions marks a decisive transformation in both the conceptualization and the prosecution of genocide within international criminal justice. International tribunals have frequently rendered interpretations of genocide that depart from the original intent of the 1948 Genocide Convention, at times construing its definition so narrowly as to risk excluding certain forms of mass violence, and at others, stretching its language to cover conduct beyond the drafters' purview. While these judicial pronouncements are influential, they do not possess binding force over domestic legal systems. Rather, they serve as persuasive precedent, providing a powerful body of interpretive guidance for national courts to consult when classifying and adjudicating genocidal acts under prevailing international norms. Structured around clearly formulated legal issues, this article provides a focused and logically cohesive analysis of genocide's constituent elements as defined and applied in domestic criminal law.