Аннотация
Introduction This study compares two asymmetrical security models in Eurasia: Europe’s NATO-centered security architecture, which relies on extended nuclear deterrence, and Kazakhstan’s institutionalized strategy of denuclearization. Methods The theoretical framework is grounded primarily in classical realism, especially Morgenthau’s state-centric understanding of power and national interest, while Aron’s work is used to clarify the relationship between military force and diplomacy. The study uses structured qualitative comparative case study supported by descriptive quantitative indicators for the period 1991–2025. The empirical basis includes indicators of global nuclear arsenals, defense expenditure, and institutional security assessments drawn from standardized international datasets. Results This article argues that nuclear deterrence and denuclearization represent structurally distinct security logics rather than comparable variants. While European security remains embedded in extended deterrence structures mediated through NATO and key nuclear states, Kazakhstan’s security model is based on strategic denuclearization and multilateral non-proliferation commitments. Discussion The comparison demonstrates that these models reflect different positions within the global nuclear order rather than alternative implementations of a single deterrence framework. The article contributes by reframing the comparison as one between Europe’s NATO-centered security architecture and Kazakhstan’s denuclearized security model. Rather than comparing equivalent political actors, the study compares two distinct forms of institutional embeddedness within the global nuclear order.