THE PARADOX OF INVESTMENT WITHOUT ATTRACTION: CHINA’S SOFT POWER CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA

2026

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DOI 10.48371/ismo.2026.64.2.017
Достоверность данных 70 средняя
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Аннотация

This study examines the paradox of Chinese soft power in Central Asia, where massive Belt and Road Initiative investments correlate with declining rather than increasing influence. Through a systematic literature review of 20 scholarly works published between 2019 and 2025, the research synthesizes empirical evidence on economic engagement, cultural initiatives, public opinion trends, and implementation challenges across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite $54.8 billion in Chinese investment and extensive cultural diplomacy, including 13 Confucius Institutes, public favorability toward China declined significantly in Kazakhstan (44% to 33%, 2017-2021) and Kyrgyzstan (41% to 31%), while 98 anti-Chinese protests occurred between 2018 and 2020. The analysis reveals that state-directed soft power approaches undermine authenticity, implementation failures damage credibility, Xinjiang policies generate co-ethnic solidarity opposition in border states, and visible Chinese labor presence triggers resentment despite economic benefits. Employing Joseph Nye’s soft power theory and realist balance of power theory, the study demonstrates that Central Asian states engage in soft balancing-accepting economic cooperation while enacting legislative restrictions on Chinese activities to preserve autonomy. Geographic variation proves systematic: border states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) exhibit sustained resistance due to historical territorial disputes and co-ethnic populations in Xinjiang, while non-border states show greater tolerance. The findings challenge assumptions about economic interdependence translating into political influence, revealing structural limitations on authoritarian soft power projection. The research contributes theoretical insights into asymmetric influence relationships and documents Central Asian agency in navigating great power competition through multivectoral balancing strategies that extract resources while constraining dominance.