ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION MECHANISMS IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROCESSES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2026

Полный текст Открытый доступ: Hybrid Метаданные (CSL-JSON)
DOI 10.58805/kazutb.v.1.30-1315
Достоверность данных 85 высокая
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Аннотация

The aim is to explore the economic effectiveness of international mediation mechanisms in nuclear disarmament processes by comparing approaches across institutions and results. The research explores the extent to which structured mediation processes, such as those established by concessions made by Member States in areas of formal UN mediation mechanisms; by the UN Geneva Forum on Disarmament and other specific multilateral arenas, lead to a cost-effective process toward disarmament objectives. Employing document analysis and comparative legal methodology, the paper examines economic factors such implementation costs, transaction costs and resource allocation efficiency in various models of mediation. Special consideration is also paid to Kazakhstan's institutional experience in conducting international initiatives related to nuclear disarmament, including the context of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and bilateral mediation. The results indicate that neither mechanism is best in all settings and more broadly, hybrid mediation forms consisting of formal institutional mechanisms into which certain specialized diplomatic tools are subsumed yield higher payoffs than stand-alone mechanisms. In practical terms, «hybrid» mediation combines treaty-based UN processes with auxiliary implementation and verification toolkits (e.g., START linked to CTR-type technical cooperation etc.), thereby reducing duplication and transaction costs. The study shows that the cost benefit ratio is highly dependent on institutional design, transparency mechanisms and verification. The paper finds that economic efficiency in nuclear disarmament mediation is largely contingent upon institutional co-ordination, transparent handling of resources and the integration of verification modalities into the intermediary’s design. These results are relevant for policy-makers engaged in gaining the best advantage from international arms reduction initiatives, while still adhering to measure standards and satisfying strategic objectives nearly as efficiently as possible.