Аннотация
In this paper, a non-zero-sum game model for budget allocation is developed that takes into account the interests of three participants: citizens of the region (through voting), maslikhats (through taking into account the strategic goals of regional development) and businesses (focused on return on investment). In contrast to conventional linear models, this method uses intricate utility functions to better capture stakeholder conflicting interests and decision-making behaviors. By capturing diminishing marginal gains for citizens, the logarithmic utility function makes sure that more investments in a sector result in gradually less perceived advantages. The model is implemented using numerical optimization techniques, specifically the interior point algorithm, which effectively handles nonlinear constraints and ensures a globally balanced budget distribution. The optimization process required 40 iterations, progressively improving the objective function, with the final total utility reaching 9.5681 × 10⁶. The results validate the proposed model’s ability to allocate resources equitably and efficiently while maintaining alignment with regional priorities and economic considerations. Furthermore, the study highlights the practical implications of game-theoretic models in budget allocation, demonstrating how strategic interactions between stakeholders can shape more transparent and rational decision-making processes. The results indicate that this approach can be expanded for dynamic planning and strategic modeling, allowing for future enhancements incorporating adaptive strategies, Nash equilibrium analysis, and real-time adjustments based on changing socio-economic conditions. The proposed model significantly enhances the efficiency, fairness, and transparency of budget allocation, making it a promising tool for decision-makers in public finance and policy planning.