Аңдатпа
In the context of escalating cyber threats, the protection of critical infrastructure has acquired particular significance for Indo-Pacific states. In May 2025, the Japanese Parliament adopted the Active Cyber Defense Act, for the first time granting the government authority for preventive monitoring of communications metadata, remote access to attacker infrastructure, and neutralization of malicious servers abroad. The adoption of the law was preceded by a five-year cyber espionage campaign by the Chinese group MirrorFace, which conducted over 200 attacks against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and a number of politicians. The present study examines this law not as a linear expansion of defense powers, but as a structural rupture in which cyberspace is constructed as a domain beyond constitutional constraints. The novelty of the research lies in analyzing the law through the prism of the Copenhagen School securitization theory and the cyber-securitization concept of Hansen and Nissenbaum. The article employs methods of discourse analysis, process-tracing, and comparative analysis of the four pillars of the law. The results demonstrate that the technification of threat serves as the key mechanism of depoliticization, enabling the removal of preventive cyber operations from the jurisdiction of Article 9 without formal constitutional revision, thereby creating a precedent for analogous processes in other technological domains. The practical significance of the findings lies in identifying a model of constitutional transformation applicable to the analysis of emerging security challenges in cyberspace, autonomous weapons systems, and electromagnetic spectrum operations.